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Abstract
This paper studies the determinants and behavior of outstanding mortgage loan
to value (LTV) ratios for a panel data set of 5,179 households over the period
1992-2005. We find that outstanding LTVs are driven by household character-
istics, life-cycle effects and mortgage type characteristics. LTV declines with
the time elapsed since mortgage commencement, but its level is consistently
higher (by around 10%) for non-repayment mortgages (such as interest-only or
endowment mortgages) than for repayment mortgages (such as linear or annuity
mortgages). The difference results from higher debt capacity associated with the
possibility of deferring the principal repayment for non-repayment mortgages.
Our results indicate that the recent proliferation of non-repayment mortgages
is driven by tightening financing constraints due to declining affordability in
the housing market and that the overall quality of outstanding mortgages has
substantially deteriorated over the last decade.
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For a number years we have witnessed an increase in homeownership rates and in
the amount of aggregate mortgage debt both in the US and across the world (e.g.,
Li (2005) and OECD (2006a)). The very easy access to credit and the proliferation
of more flexible mortgage products have made mortgages available to households that
would not be able to afford a house a few decades ago.
The recent rise in home foreclosures and the ’subprime’ mortgage crisis have, how-
ever, drawn attention to a number of worrying developments and trends in mortgage
lending. In particular, there has been a notable increase in recent years in lending
to high-risk, so-called subprime, borrowers as well as a rise in non-performing mort-
gages (see Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2008)). Loan incentives such as ‘interest-only’
mortgages, low initial ‘teaser’ rates, repayment holidays and laxer lending criteria are
frequently cited as having encouraged borrowers to take on more debt than they can
handle.
The situation in the housing market has a considerable effect on the whole economy.
The aggregate value of the owner-occupied housing stock in the US increased from $2.8
trillion in 1982 to $7.3 trillion in 1999 (see Case (2000)), which is comparable with half
of the American stock market capitalization. Consequently, any wave of households
entering into negative equity, resulting bankruptcies and forced sales would all feed
back into the stability of the financial system, consumer demand and, in general,
economic growth itself. A proper understanding of the riskiness of household mortgage
debt is therefore key to assessing measures and designing policies aimed at preserving
the stability of the economic growth. Since mortgages are secured by the value of
the house, the mortgage credit risk is in the first instance determined by the ratio
of the outstanding mortgage debt to the value of the house, commonly known as the
loan-to-value (LTV hereafter).1
The academic literature has, however, devoted surprisingly little attention to the
analysis of outstanding LTV. To quote Follain (1990) in his presidential address to
the AREUEA: ”Although much has been written about the aggregate demand for
mortgages, housing economists do not seem to have picked up on what many finan-
cial economists have made a career of doing – explaining debt-equity ratios.”2 In his
1Von Furstenberg (1969) was one of the first to show that the loan-to-value ratio governs the level
of default rates over the life of the mortgage. He found that reducing the downpayment in the highest
LTV range by as little as 1% of home value can cause default rates to rise by 50%. More recently,
Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2008) show that in the run-up to the mortgage crisis high LTV borrowers
became increasingly riskier compared to low LTV borrowers.
2The few exceptions include Englund, Hendershott, and Turner (1996), who study the effect on
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presidential address to the AFA, Campbell (2006) states that household finance is an
underresearched area and he points out the lack of good quality data as one of the
main reasons.
This paper aims to address this gap and presents an empirical study on housing
finance. As detailed international micro-level data of housing finance is not readily
available, we test our hypotheses using a detailed survey data from the Netherlands.
As we motivate later, the characteristics of the economic and legal framework in the
Netherlands allow us readily to generalize many of our conclusions to other countries
(see Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008), who use data from the same survey). Our
paper addresses the following questions. What are the determinants of LTV for home-
owners who have outstanding mortgage debt? How does LTV vary over a household’s
lifecycle? How has the proliferation in recent years of mortgages without compulsory
amortization (such as ‘interest-only’ mortgages) affected LTVs and what are their long-
term consequences for LTV ratios? What are the characteristics of households that
choose a mortgage product without compulsory amortization and have they changed
over time? And, finally, are higher LTV ratios and repayment flexibility reflected in
mortgage interest rates?
While there is vast theoretical and empirical evidence that corporations follow some
optimal leverage level, we find that for households outstanding LTV declines as the
time from mortgage commencement elapses. Amortization of the mortgage debt is one
obvious reason. Appreciation in the value of the house may be another one. There
appears to be little or no evidence that the initial LTV at mortgage commencement is
anything like an intertemporal optimum that households seek to maintain. Moreover,
the dispersion in outstanding LTVs is quite large (especially compared to the variation
in corporate leverage ratios). A histogram of outstanding LTV ratios in our study
reveals that the average LTV of households with outstanding mortgage debt in our
sample is 0.497 with a standard deviation of 0.270. Importantly, more than 15% of the
homeowners in our sample do not have any outstanding mortgage debt.
What explains this wide dispersion of outstanding LTV across homeowners? We
find a pronounced life-cycle effect in LTV in that LTV declines with the time elapsed
housing finance of financial deregulation in Sweden during the 1980s based on data on loan-to-value
ratios for homeowners that moved recently, and Hendershott and Pryce (2006), who report a sub-
stantial decline in LTVs following the abolishment of mortgage interest relief for taxation purposes in
the UK. In a related work, Koijen, Van Hemert, and van Nieuwerburgh (2008) investigate the choice
between the adjustable and fixed rate mortgages.
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since mortgage commencement. Furthermore, we identify a number of other determi-
nants of LTV. The number of household members is shown to positively affect LTV,
whereas a household’s net worth (total assets minus total outstanding debt) negatively
influences it. This latter effect follows from the fact that households with low net worth
are more likely to be financially constrained and may have to rely more heavily on debt
financing. Households on social benefits and those facing a higher tax rate also exhibit
a higher LTV.
We also show that the mortgage type adopted is an important explanatory variable
of outstanding LTV, with non-compulsory repayment contracts being associated with
higher levels of debt. One explanation for this may be that the reduction in the out-
standing mortgage debt is primarily determined by a compulsory amortization schedule
for repayment mortgages, whereas repayment of outstanding debt is left to the discre-
tion of the borrower in the case of non-repayment mortgages. More surprisingly, the
wedge in LTV between both mortgage types remains even if one adjusts non-repayment
mortgages for the cash value of the savings that have been accumulated in special in-
vestment vehicles linked to the mortgage. A striking trend during our sample period
is the dramatic increase in the mortgage to income ratio, especially for non-repayment
mortgages.
The combination of higher LTV and substantially higher loan-to-income ratios for
’non-repayment’ mortgages indicates that these mortgages are potentially riskier than
repayment mortgages. This finding is consistent with the fact that the recent surge
in mortgage defaults in the US and the UK has been linked primarily to mortgages
that share many of the features present in non-repayment mortgages. Why then have
so many households chosen to adopt non-repayment mortgages in recent years? We
investigate the households propensity to select a non-repayment type mortgage (as
opposed to a repayment mortgage) using a binary choice (probit) model and show
that the proliferation of non-repayment mortgages has been driven primarily by the
dramatic decline in housing affordability.3 This is consistent with the observation that
over the period of our sample the house price index (HPI1994 = 100) rose from 80 in
3There may, of course, be other reasons for the proliferation of non-repayment mortgages that we do
not capture in our study. For example, mortgage brokers typically receive a higher commission on non-
repayment type mortgages and may therefore have incentives to oversell these products. Examples of
this behavior are the reported cases in the UK of ‘endowment’ mortgages that were sold to borrowers
for whom this product was inappropriate. These cases prompted an investigation by the Financial
Services Authority, who subsequently tightened up the UK code of mortgage lending practice in order
better to protect borrowers against this type of misselling.
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1992 to 280 in 2005, whereas house affordability (as defined in Appendix A) declined
from about 117 in 1992 to about 50 in 2005. Another important reason for the increased
popularity in non-repayment mortgages is the tax advantages they confer. Our findings
indicate that non-repayment mortgages relax financing constraints and help households
to catch up (in the short run at least) with the soaring house prices.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 discusses empirical
hypotheses, Section 2 presents the data set, whereas Section 3 describes the main trends
in the Dutch housing market. Section 4 focuses on the univariate analysis, which is
followed by the regression analysis of Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
1 Hypotheses
While firms and households show many similarities, they are also different in a number
of ways. Unlike corporations, households have finite horizons and are likely to be risk-
averse. Therefore, we postulate that the household financing decisions are the outcome
of the interplay of factors that affect their demand for financing as well as the ability
to service debt. Some of the factors are expected to parallel those of corporations, such
as net worth, income or education (serving as a proxy for both financial sophistication
and the future income generating ability). The other factors we consider are specific to
households. Age is expected to be one of key determinants of leverage because the level
of mortgage debt tends to decline along the life cycle. Finally, variables such as the
number of household members and the degree of urbanization determine the demand
for housing so they are likely to affect the LTV ratio as well. Our first empirical
hypothesis is therefore:
H1: The LTV ratio is a function of socio-demographic variables, such as income,
net worth, education, household size, location as well as the stage in the household’s
life-cycle.
Mortgage contracts analyzed in our study differ predominantly with respect to
repayment flexibility. We classify mortgages into ‘repayment’ mortgages and ’non-
repayment’ mortgages. The former are defined as mortgages that have a compul-
sory amortization schedule (such as ‘annuity’ and ‘linear’ mortgages) and the latter
as mortgages that leave discretion with respect to the amortization schedule (such as
‘interest-only’ mortgages and ‘endowment’ mortgages).4 As the mortgage choice re-
4For example, with a ‘linear’ mortgage the periodical payments include paying off the interest on
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flects a household’s preferences for repayment flexibility, we put forward the following
hypothesis:
H2: Flexible mortgages are associated with higher LTV ratios throughout the life of
the mortgage.
One obvious motivation for this hypothesis is the fact that the reduction in the out-
standing mortgage debt is primarily determined by a compulsory amortization schedule
for repayment mortgages, whereas repayment of outstanding debt is left to the discre-
tion of the borrower in the case of non-repayment mortgages. In addition, households
who select non-compulsory repayment mortgages self-select to do so and, therefore, are
likely to value (and to use) the flexibility their contracts are associated with.
To address the evolution of the LTV rates over time and the associated prolifera-
tion of the non-compulsory repayment mortgages, we test three additional hypotheses.
First, we point out that it is not always obvious whether a higher LTV implies riskier
mortgage debt. Both i) the higher LTV level and ii) the proliferation of flexible (i.e.,
with no compulsory repayment of the principal) contracts may also be a result of
sophisticated optimizing investors shifting to the flexible products once they become
available in the market. Households on a high income may, for example, adopt flexible
non-repayment mortgages because of tax considerations. Our hypothesis is therefore:
H3a: Households adopt flexible contracts in order to exploit the advantages of debt,
such as tax savings.
If the non-compulsory repayment contracts are chosen by financially sophisticated
households, then their proliferation and the (resulting) higher LTVs are a sign of a
rational response of optimizing agents to the emergence of new products. For financially
sophisticated households, variables such as education and income will have a positive
effect on the probability of selecting flexible mortgages and on the levels of LTV, as they
indicate a higher level of wealth and financial sophistication. Moreover, the differences
the outstanding loan and a fixed percentage of the total loan. On the other hand, with an ‘interest-
only’ mortgage one pays interest during the term of the mortgage and a large ‘balloon’ payment at
the end. Other mortgages covered by our study are ‘traditional life-insurance’ mortgages, ‘improved
life-insurance’ mortgages, ’investment’ mortgages, ‘annuity’ mortgages and ’life-insurance’ mortgages.
The various mortgage types covered in our study are discussed in more detail in Section 3.4. Definitions
of each mortgage type can also be found in the Appendix B. Note that the typical distinction between
fixed rate and variable rate mortgages is less important in the Netherlands because the overwhelming
majority of mortgages are fixed rate mortgages.
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between the characteristics of borrowers choosing standard and flexible contracts should
prevail over time. If these are financially sophisticated households who choose the
flexible, high LTV products, then the proliferation of non-repayment contracts will
generally not be associated with higher credit risk.
The alternative hypothesis is that the flexible contracts (and higher LTV) are mostly
selected by financially constrained households, who – otherwise – would not be able to
afford a house. In such a case, the proliferation of flexible contracts and the increase
in average LTV would be an indicator of higher credit risk.
H3b: Households adopt flexible contracts to alleviate financing constraints.
If the alternative hypothesis H3b is true, then measures of financial constraints are
the main determinants of the mortgage type choice. The choice of higher leverage
and non-compulsory repayment contracts will be unrelated to marginal tax rates and
will not depend (or will depend negatively) on the measures of financial sophistication
(such as education). The total pool of mortgage contracts will become more risky
over time as the households with worse characteristics follow the wealthier and more
sophisticated ones in choosing non-repayment contracts.
Our final hypothesis is related to the potential cost of leverage and of repayment
flexibility.
H4: The interest rate increases with the LTV ratio and is higher for non-repayment
mortgages.
Households who decide to borrow more or to select a non-compulsory repayment
contract may face an upward sloping supply curve of mortgage loans, which translates
into higher borrowing rates. In equilibrium, some households may find it optimal to
accept higher mortgage interest rates as a price for the benefits of higher borrowing and
for the flexibility embedded in the non-repayment contracts. The alternative hypothesis
is that higher LTV ratios and flexible contracts are not associated with higher interest
rates. If flexible mortgages come at no additional cost, then rational borrowers may




The data set used is based on the DNB Household Survey (DHS) carried out by Cen-
tERdata, a data collection unit of the Center for Economic Research at Tilburg Uni-
versity (see also Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008)). The (rotating) panel covers
the period 1992-2005, containing end of the year data for a yearly average of over 1000
representative households in the Netherlands, and provides very unique information
about the financing, spending, labor and social decisions of individual households. Ob-
servations considered are the ones in which all relevant parts of the questionnaire were
answered by household members.5 The sample therefore comprises 13,546 household-
years (9,422 owners, 4,124 renters), 7,860 of which being borrowers (5,731 with non-
repayment and 2,129 with repayment contracts). For descriptive analysis purposes,
the sample is divided in 4 periods (1992-1995, 1996-1998, 1999-2002, and 2003-2005).
Households responding to all parts of the questionnaire in several years are consid-
ered as different observations. In the regression analysis, we control for the potential
correlation of error terms within a household.
All currency-denominated values are expressed in euro (using the official NLG/e
2.20371 conversion rate), and are in real terms. Inflation correction was made through-
out the period for all currency denominated variables, considering the Consumer Price
Index (CPI) as deflator. The reference year considered is 1994 (CPI1994 = 100).
Data collection for households and individuals involves several challenges, mainly
due to privacy and refusal issues. Still, our data set contains a significant number of
observations, a representative demographic spread and a good coverage of the main
household variables, such as housing, assets, liabilities, and personal information. Fur-
thermore, an exhaustive categorization within these classes of variables is available, in
particular for housing and mortgage variables. Thus, we can assume our sample to be
”of quality”, according to the requirements postulated in Campbell (2006).6
Finally, the economic and legal factors that influence homeownership and housing
finance are fairly homogenous across the Netherlands (unlike the United States or
Germany, for example, where legislation, taxation and financial policy may vary across
5We removed extreme outliers as well as implausible observations from the data. The following
criteria led to the omission of an observation from the sample: total asset value above e5m, net income
value above e2m, mortgage interest rate above 20%, house value above e2m, LTV ratio above 1.5,
and the age of the eldest member of the household (in years) above 100.
6Bucks and Pence (2006) demonstrate the reliability of household surveys by providing empirical
support for the accuracy of the house values and mortgage data reported by the US survey respondents.
8
states). Furthermore, the LTV behavior in the Netherlands have been less distorted by
incentives problems of lenders and financial intermediaries. Unlike the US, the practice
of passing on credit risk through mortgage securitization is still comparatively rare. As
a result incentive and monitoring problems have not been as severe. This is one of the
reasons why lending standards have not been loosened as much over time. We believe
for the above reasons that the Netherlands is particularly suitable for investigating this
paper’s research questions (see also Charlier and van Bussel (2003)).
3 Trends and determinants of housing finance
3.1 General trends
The reported percentage of owner-occupied homes in the Netherlands in 1990, 1994,
1998, 2000, 2002 and 2006 were respectively 45.3%, 47.6%, 50.8%, 52.2%, 54.0% and
54.2% (Ministry of Housing (2002) and CBS).7
The increase in the total housing stock has been very modest. Figure 1 shows
that the housing stock has merely kept pace with the rising trend in the number of
households. The number of households increased from 6.266 million in 1992 to 7.091
million in 2005, whereas the corresponding numbers for the housing stock are 6.043
and 6.912 million, respectively. In contrast, the house price index (HPI) constructed
by the Dutch land registry office has risen from 81 in 1992 (with HPI1994 = 100) to
a spectacular 279 in 2005. This translates into an annual growth rate of about 10%.
Furthermore, household income has risen at a much lower pace causing the affordability
ratio in 2005 to be less than half its 1992 level. The OECD (2004) reports that housing
affordability in the Netherlands (defined as the proportion of available income to house
price value) declined more than anywhere else, except for Spain, during the period
1991 to 2002. Brounen, Neuteboom, and van Dijkhuizen (2006) predict that housing
affordability in the Netherlands (with an average spending of more than 35% of income
7The reported rates are, however, still among the lowest in the European Union. The reason is that
traditionally the Netherlands have not had a large owner-occupied housing sector. The Dutch govern-
ment policy, particularly during the first half of the 20th century was very much focused on stimulating
the construction of social housing. However, since the early 90s the Netherlands housing policy has
observed a shift, and the main housing policy objective is to promote affordable owner occupation
(Ministry of Housing (2002)). Taxation schemes, guarantees, bureaucratic and economic incentives
have been implemented as means to promote homeownership. Also, incentives to the conversion of
dwellings in the vast social rental scheme to owner occupied dwellings have been introduced.
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on housing by the end of 2007) will deteriorate more than in any other European
country.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
While affordability has fallen to a record level, interest repayments as a fraction
of disposable income have not increased by as much. The reason is that interest
rates have fallen dramatically over the sample period (from 9.27% in 1992 to 2.09%
in 2005).8 Record low interest rates have provided households with access to cheaper
credit allowing them to lever up their income aggressively in order to keep up with
rising house prices. This is reflected in the substantial increase in the loan-to-income
ratio (see section 3.3).
With regards to our data, homeownership rates in the sample are somewhat higher
than the rates for the Netherlands as a whole. Table 1 shows that owner occupancy
rates in our sample are 71.7%, 68.7%, 67.0%, and 67.8% for the respective four periods.9
About 3% of households in the total sample own a second house, but this proportion
has been declining from 3.7% in the first sample period to 1.7% in the last sample
period.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Table 1 also shows that the average initial loan-to-value (i.e. at the time of mortgage
commencement) has fallen from 80.3% to 75.2% over the period of study. Average
8The 1992 interest rate refers to the Guilder Market Interest Rate, whereas the 2005 rate refers to
the Eurozone Interest Rate.
9There are a number of potential reasons why observed ownership rates are higher than the ones
observed in the official statistics. It is likely that our sample does not adequately include certain
segments of the population that typically do not own their home. For example, homeless or very
poor people are under-represented in our sample. Also households that are highly mobile or do not
have a fixed residence are less likely to be included in our survey. Elderly people who have sold their
home to pay for a room in a care-home would neither appear in our sample. These are all people who
typically are unlikely to own their home. Finally, single person households are significantly under-
represented in our sample. Since the homeownership rate is substantially lower for this group (only
42%) this creates another upward bias in our ownership rates. We conclude that higher availability
of information on housing issues for homeowners may therefore lead to a bias in the questionnaire
response rates towards the observed higher proportion of homeowners.
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outstanding loan-to-value of households has dropped from 44.4% to 39.9%. If we take
out households without a mortgage then the average loan to value has dropped from
52.9% in the first period to 44.8% in the third period, only partially bouncing back
in the last period to 48.2%. The drop in outstanding loan-to-value ratios have to be
interpreted, however, in the context of inflated house prices, the spectacular rise in
loan-to-income ratios and trends in various other determinants of LTV. In fact, our
regression analysis in next section shows that, when controlling for other effects, there
is a positive time trend in outstanding LTV.
3.2 Household balance sheet and income: Owners vs. renters
Table 2 shows the balance sheet for the average homeowner and non-homeowner house-
hold. The data are reported in an analogous way as for public corporations whenever
possible. Although we have detailed data for assets and liabilities, developing an income
statement for households is not possible as information about household consumption
and expenses is not disclosed in our data set.10
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Starting with homeowners’ assets, the balance sheet shows that the house counts
for 75.7% of the assets of the average household in the total sample. Another 1.4%
and 3.5% are to be attributed to a second house or other real estate investments,
respectively. Cash accounts and cash savings together account for another 7.6%. In-
surance policies, financial market based savings, money lent and other savings together
count for about 7.2%. Vehicles count for 3.9%. Total assets for homeowners amount to
e205,860 on average. In contrast, total assets for non-homeowners are only e22,128 on
average. In the absence of real estate the asset portfolio is much more weighted towards
savings and financial investments. Cash accounts and cash savings together count for
49.2%. Insurance policies, financial market based savings, money lent and other savings
together count for another 31.3%. Vehicles make up the remaining 19.5%.11
On the liability side household equity (net worth) counts for 66.1% for homeowners
in the full sample. Consequently, the majority of households assets has been financed
10For a detailed analysis of household portfolios and their international comparisons, see Guiso,
Haliassos, and Jappelli (2002).
11The above proportions have been fairly constant over time, except that financial market based
savings have observed a significant increase in the third period.
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by retained income, accumulated wealth, or money transfers such as endowments,
donations or inheritance. The mortgage on the house counts for 30.1%. In comparison,
the other financing sources are negligibly small. The analysis of external housing
finance can therefore safely be restricted to mortgage financing. More than 80% of
house owners finance their property using a mortgage. This fact is consistent with
the Income Panel Survey (IPO, Inkomens Panelonderzoek), and with the findings of
Alessie, Hochguertel, and van Soest (2002) in their analysis of household assets and
liabilities portfolios in the Netherlands.
Net worth of non-homeowners counts for 88.1% of all liabilities. 5.6% of assets are
financed by short-term extended lines of credit (4.8%), overdrafts (0.6%) or credit cards
(0.2%). Medium term financing (mainly private and study loans) count for another
4.5%. Loans from family and friends and other loans count for the remaining 1.8%.12
Home-owning households in our sample have an average total salary of e30,837, an
average gross income of e42,595, and an average net income of e29,197. For households
that do not own their home these values are substantially lower and respectively given
by e18,324, e26,596 and e18,917. In our regression analysis we use adjusted income
equivalence values according to the number of household members, which represent a
better relative earning position of the household. The equivalence is computed using
the Eurostat scale, which considers the first household member with a factor 1, the
second 0.5, and any additional member 0.3. The equivalence values are then equal to
per capita values where the number of household members is calculated according to
the relevant scale.13
[Insert Table 3 about here]
3.3 Housing finance structure
Dutch house prices have boomed since the start of our period of analysis. In our sample,
average house values rise substantially too during the period of observation. Although
our data reflect house values perceived by households and not actual transaction values,
research has shown that house values reported by survey respondents are fairly reliable
12The composition of liabilities has remained fairly stable over time. Mortgage financing has declined
somewhat in favor of net worth.
13For a detailed discussion of this and other used income equivalence scales see OECD (2006b).
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and accurate (see, e.g., Bucks and Pence (2006)). The average real house value for
our sample over the full period of study is e171,613, and grew from e135,104 in the
1992-95 period to e242,426 in the 2003-05 period. As can be seen from Figure 1, our
average sample house values are in line with the house price index.
Figure 2 (Panels B-D) shows frequency histograms of the average initial loan to
values (ILTV) and the average loan to values during the periods under consideration.14
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Table 4 documents the evolution of loan-to-income ratios for repayment and non-
repayment mortgages. While for repayment mortgages the ratio remains fairly constant
around 1.4, the ratio rises for the increasingly ubiquitous non-repayment mortgages
from 1.71 in 1992 to 2.99 in 2005.
[Insert Table 4 about here]
The data shows a clear link between outstanding LTV and age. The average out-
standing LTV for homeowners below the age of 35 is 0.62. This fraction falls approx-
imately by 0.1 for every 10 years of age that is being added, leaving over 65 year old
homeowners with an average outstanding LTV of 0.19. Note that between 80% to 90%
of all homeowners up to the age of 65 have a mortgage, but only 65% of owners over
65 have a mortgage. This sudden drop can be explained by the fact that mortgages
usually have a 30-year term in the Netherlands.
3.4 Mortgage types
Table 5 provides information on the various mortgage types in our data. The definition
of each mortgage type is included in Appendix B. As previously explained mortgage
types have been divided into two categories: repayment mortgages and non-repayment
mortgages. Mortgage types falling into the former category are annuity mortgages
and linear mortgages, whereas the latter category includes the various types of life-
insurance mortgages, endowment mortgages, investment mortgages and interest-only
mortgages.
14When computing the descriptive statistics, we removed observations with an initial loan-to-value
of less than 0.1 or more than 1.1. Outstanding loan-to-value observations are not affected by this data
selection, and hence no effect from this procedure is found in the regression results of Section 4.
13
[Insert Table 5 about here]
Table 5 reports the frequencies for each mortgage type in our sample, as well as the
average loan-to-value for each mortgage type. We consider both initial loan-to-values
(i.e., upon mortgage commencement) and the loan-to-values at the time of the survey.
Mortgages with a compulsory repayment component accounted for 36.0% of all
mortgages at the start of the sample period. This number had fallen to 12.9% by the
end of the sample period. Life insurance mortgages (and its variants) accounted for
47.3% at the start of the sample period, and had dropped to 32.3% for the last period.
Most noticeable is the spectacular rise of pure interest-only mortgages which do not
feature in a specific category for the first two periods, but amount to 36.6% of all
mortgages in the last period.
Interestingly, average initial loan-to-value in our sample has been consistently be-
tween about 70% and 80% for all types of mortgages. Cases of initial loan-to-value close
and above 100% do occur, however, as legally no initial loan-to-value limit is imposed
in The Netherlands.15 Interest-only mortgages, dominant in the last years of the sam-
ple, have lower average initial loan-to-values than other mortgage types. Possibly, the
absence of compulsory capital repayments (or any other associated investment vehicle
that can act as collateral), and the lower collateral for the lender compared to other
mortgage types, leads to a higher initial down-payment requirement as a guarantee.
As to be expected, the evolution of the loan-to-value over time varies dramatically
across mortgage types: average LTVs decline much faster for repayment mortgages than
for those mortgage types that do not have a compulsory repayment of the principal.
Average LTVs for the former category are more than 40% lower than the initial LTV
(e.g. the average LTV for annuity mortgages drops from 80% at commencement to
40% at the time of the survey). For the latter category this drop is within the range of
20% to 35% and the ultimate repayment of the principal when the mortgage expires
(or if the housing market were to enter in a recession) remains therefore much more
uncertain.
The existence of a lower loan to value and faster repayment for compulsory repay-
ment mortgages is true even if one deducts the cash value of life insurance policies from
the outstanding debt in life-insurance type mortgages (life insurance, traditional life
insurance, and improved traditional life insurance mortgages).16
15In practice 125% is, however, considered an upper bound by most lenders.
16In our data set this insurance policy value is reported since 2000. For households reporting
positive value in life insurance policies associated to their mortgages, the policy represents on average
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Given that mortgages without a compulsory repayment have become much more
prevalent in recent years this may have implications for future homeownership. In
particular, when the mortgage expires (typically by the time the mortgagee retires,
considering the usual 30 year maturity of mortgages in the Netherlands) some of the
less wealthy households may have to sell off the property in order to pay off the out-
standing debt. Unless a new and smaller house is bought this may lead to a drop in
homeownership rates for households that are retired. Brounen and Neuteboom (2006)
estimate however that this pressure in homeownership will not be as pronounced as
initially expected. In light of the recent US mortgage crisis it should also be noted that
mortgages with a higher outstanding LTV may be more exposed to a recession in the
housing market.
The increased popularity of non-repayment mortgages may, in part, be due to the
tax advantages they confer. Until 1997 interest from all types of household debt (mort-
gage debt and the different consumer debt types) was tax deductible. Between 1997
and 2000 a phasing out process of the deductibility of consumer debt interest and mort-
gage interest not associated with the primary residence was implemented. Since 2000
interest tax deductibility has been confined to the main loan used for purchase (and
maintenance) of the primary residence but, unlike most other countries, the total de-
ductible value is uncapped. However, interest on consumer debt, mortgages on second
homes and on mortgage equity withdrawals are disqualified for tax-shield purposes.
The new tax policy therefore makes mortgage debt more attractive than other forms of
credit and puts investors in real estate at a disadvantage compared to first-time buyers.
Taxation policy has had an effect on the choice between mortgages with compulsory
and non-compulsory principal repayment. Official evidence shows that the concession
of tax benefits and guarantees for house owners coincided not only with an increase
in owner occupied housing, but also with a wave of re-mortgaging and a shift to more
interest-based mortgages (Ministry of Housing (2002)). This latter effect is observed in
our sample and was described above. Finally, towards the end of our sample period the
banking industry created numerous financial products combining mortgage tax shields
and capital gains concessions, which observe high popularity.17
6.5% and 7.2% of the total value of the house, respectively, in periods 1999-02 and 2003-05, to which
correspond an average corrected loan to value of 0.47 and 0.49. These corrected loan to value figures
are substantially higher than the ones observed for mortgages with compulsory repayment.
17In the Netherlands capital gains on personally held assets are not taxed. However, taxable returns
on capital assets are set at a presumptive rate of 4% of the value of the assets, and taxed at a 30% rate.
This taxation scheme is however not valid for owner occupied real estate, where concessions are made
15
The government’s homeownership policies, increased banking competition and eas-
ier access to mortgage debt (e.g. by considering dual income for credit scoring pur-
poses) had not only an effect on homeownership rates, but were also key factors in the
evolution of house prices (Brounen, Neuteboom, and van Dijkhuizen (2006)).
4 Univariate analysis
To analyze the outstanding mortgage loan to value ratio of households, it is important
to recognize that the LTV is only defined for those households that own their home.
It is therefore important first to analyze what differentiates homeowners from renters.
In this section we define and analyze a number of variables that are traditionally con-
sidered to be important determinants of homeownership. We use a univariate analysis
and non-parametric tests to explore whether homeowners are inherently different from
renters in terms of their characteristics.
Next we focus on the housing finance decision. As will be shown later, the type of
mortgage contract adopted (that is, ”repayment” mortgage contract versus the flexible
“non-repayment” mortgage) has important implications for the level and evolution of
the outstanding mortgage LTV. We postpone the explicit modeling of a household’s
outstanding LTV till later and explore in this section what differentiates homeowners
that choose a repayment mortgage from those that adopt a non-repayment mortgage.
For this purpose we perform a univariate analysis similar to the one that compares
owners with renters.
We start off by defining the main explanatory variables used in this study (for all
variable definitions, see Appendix A). These variables include a mix of income related,
socio-economic, demographic and geographic variables that traditionally are considered
to be important determinants of homeownership and the housing finance decision.
The existing literature identifies household income as an important determinant
of homeownership (Linneman and Wachter (1989)) and housing finance (Hendershott
and Pryce (2006)). We define the variable INCOME as the combined gross income
of all household members adjusted for the number of household members using the
as part of the national housing policy. Taxation on owner occupied housing assets is done through the
calculation of an estimated rental value of 1.25% of the value of the house minus mortgage interest,
making investment in real estate (financed by mortgage debt) for owner occupancy more attractive
relative to other assets. For a detailed discussion of the taxation scheme in the Netherlands, see
Cnossen and Bovenberg (2001), and Rele and van Steen (2001).
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Eurostat equivalence scale.18 As the maximum mortgage loan advanced by lenders
is often a multiple of household income, income therefore determines whether (and
how much) the household receives mortgage debt in the first place. Moreover, at the
time of initiating the mortgage a higher income to house value ratio implies a stronger
potential to pay off the house purchased. This allows households to adopt a higher
initial LTV. While this positive effect may be mitigated by high income households
having a higher capacity to repay debt more quickly, we would expect the effect of the
higher initial LTV to dominate.
To capture household wealth, we introduce NETWORTH, which is the difference
between the net worth and the estimated house price appreciation since its purchase.
All else equal wealthier households have the choice between converting their net worth
into liquid assets to finance the house or, alternatively, to keep (or spend) those assets
and to finance the house by debt. Households with little net worth, on the other
hand, have no other option but to finance the house by debt. Wealth constraints may
therefore induce a negative relation between net worth and the LTV.
We separately introduce the variable BENEFIT , previously not used in the lit-
erature. This variable comprises unemployment, sickness and disability benefits ad-
justed for the number of household members using the Eurostat equivalence scale.
While social benefits are a source of income, they also signal that the household may
be experiencing difficulties (such as unemployment, incapacities or illness) that could
adversely affect homeownership propensity. The effect of benefits on the financing de-
cision is therefore ambiguous. On the one hand, while benefits are a source of income,
lenders may categorize it as ’low quality’ income against which it may be more difficult
to borrow. Moreover, households are less likely to own a house. Very often, on the
other hand, households may become recipients of benefits after they have taken out a
mortgage (as result of redundancy or accidents). In that case the household’s capacity
to service the debt may, ex post, be substantially diminished making it more difficult
to reduce LTV. BENEFIT is expected to have an overall positive marginal effect on
LTV.
18We use income values that are adjusted for the number of household members, as this gives a
better measure of the relative earnings position of the household. The equivalence is computed using
the Eurostat scale, which considers the first household member with a factor 1, the second 0.5, and
any additional member 0.3. The equivalence values are then equal to per capita values where the
number of household members is calculated according to the relevant scale. For a detailed discussion
of this and other used income equivalence scales see OECD (2006b).
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TAX is defined as the estimated effective tax rate equal to the ratio of the tax
bill (the difference between the gross and net income) and the tax base (the difference
between the gross income and the estimated mortgage interest). Households with a
higher tax rate also have a higher potential tax shield. Interest on mortgage debt is
tax deductible (whereas rent is not). Furthermore, capital gains on the household’s
residence are tax exempt. The tax deductability of mortgage interest should increase
the expected outstanding mortgage debt. Furthermore, theory predicts (see Henderson
and Ioannides (1983)) that a higher, more progressive tax rate stimulates homeown-
ership because there is a bigger financial advantage from owning versus renting. The
positive effect of taxation on homeownership should further strengthen this positive
relation. The existing literature (e.g. Hendershott and Pryce (2006)) argues that taxes
may have an effect on outstanding LTV. All else equal, a household with a higher tax
bill has a higher potential tax shield and may want to adopt more debt over its life
cycle. Variable TAX captures the estimated effective tax rate faced by a household
and is predicted to have a positive relation with LTV .
We define D MEM2 and D MEM3 as dummy variables taking the value of 1
for households with exactly two and at least three members, respectively, and zero
otherwise. We expect that D MEM2 and D MEM3, as well as AGE, the age of the
oldest household member expressed in years, positively affect both the probability of
homeownership as well as LTV (the later being a result of a preference towards ceteris
paribus a bigger, thus more expensive, house). As retired households sometimes move
into homes for the elderly or convert the equity in their home into cash for consumption,
the relation between the probability of homeownership and AGE may, however, be non-
monotonic. D EDU is a dummy variable taking value of 1 for tertiary or vocational
education and zero otherwise. The effect of this variable (if any) remains an open
question. Furthermore, we introduce D URBL, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the
household lives in an area with a low degree of urbanization and 0 otherwise.19
AFF measures affordability and is defined as the ratio of the average income in
the province of household i in year t (as reported by the CBS and standardized for the
19The Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) in the Netherlands uses a measure of address density in
a particular area to measure the degree of urbanization. The degree of urbanization is expressed in 5
categories going from ‘very high’ degree of urbanization (code 1) with a density of more than 2,500
addresses per square kilometer, to a ‘very low’ degree of urbanization (code 5) with less than 500
addresses per square kilometer. The same convention is used in our data – the degree of urbanization
takes on the discrete values between 1 and 5, covering the spectrum from ‘very high’ to ‘very low’.
Our dummy variable D URBL equals one for urbanization levels 3 to 5, and zero otherwise.
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number of household members) to the average value of the house in that province (as
reported by the Dutch land registry office). RCO captures the (inverse) relative cost
of ownership and is defined as the ratio of the average rent to the average house value
in the province of household i in year t. TY PE represents the type of dwelling, and
is equal to 1 for a single family home, 2 for appartment/flat, and 3 for all other cases
(such as shared accommodation).
Finally, INT denotes the difference between the mortgage interest rate of household
i and the prevailing market interest rate in year t.
We now first explore whether renters are inherently different from homeowners in
terms of their characteristics. To test the null hypothesis that both samples (i.e., renters
and homeowners) are drawn from populations with the same distribution (the same
mean) for the various characteristics, we use the Mann-Whitney test (the t-test). We
find overwhelming evidence against the null hypothesis over the whole sample period for
pretty much all household variables considered.20 This shows that the characteristics of
renters and homeowners are fundamentally different. Using a t-test for the equality of
means, we find that homeowners exhibit higher average net worth (e103, 527 for owners
compared to e21, 608 for renters), enjoy higher income (e25, 033 versus e17, 630), are
more highly educated (0.67 versus 0.57), are subject to a higher average tax rate
(0.30 versus 0.25), have higher affordability ratio (0.12 versus 0.11). Homeowners also
receive lower social benefits than renters (e966 versus e1, 659). On the demographical
side, home-owning households are larger on average (eg. 45% have 3 or more family
members, whereas the corresponding percentage for renters is 24%). Homeowners also
live in less highly urbanized areas (with an average of 0.66 for the urbanization dummy
variable for owners and 0.44 for renters) and enjoy bigger houses (a house type indicator
equal to 1.20 and 1.54 for owners and renters, respectively). All these differences are
significant at the 1% level. The analysis of subsamples corresponding to the first and
the last sample periods indicates that the qualitative differences between homeowners
and renters prevail over time as most of the differences that are significant in the initial
period (period 1) are significant in the final period (period 4) and also over the entire
sample period.21
[Insert Table 6 about here]
20Exceptions are the variables AFF , D MEM2 and AGE for which the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected in every sample period.
21Again, the exceptions are AFF , D MEM2 and AGE, for which the difference is not always
significant.
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The second key question we address in this section relates to the type of mort-
gage financing that homeowners are using. In particular, we compare the holders of
repayment mortgages with those who opted for a non-repayment mortgage. Table 7
compares the characteristics of repayment mortgageholders and non-repayment mort-
gageholders over the total sample period, for period 1 and for period 4 (1992-1995 and
2003-2005, respectively).
Focussing on period 1 first, the Mann-Whitney test provides strong evidence that
both sub-samples are very different with respect to most explanatory variables (ex-
cept for the degree of urbanization, and the relative cost of owning versus renting).
The t-tests for the means provides evidence that in the first period more flexible non-
repayment mortgages are chosen by households with higher income (e30, 653 versus
e26, 426 for owners with a repayment mortgage), which are more highly educated
(0.71 versus 0.66) and subject to a higher tax rate (0.35 versus 0.34). In addition, non-
repayment mortgage holders are younger (46.08 years versus 49.24 years), live in bigger
houses (1.15 versus 1.25), which are more affordable (0.15 versus 0.14), have lower (in-
verse) relative cost of ownership (2.8 versus 2.82) and receive less social benefits (e753
versus e1, 303). Moreover, non-repayment mortgages are associated with higher mark-
ups on market interest rates (2.38 versus 1.86). All the differences are significant at a
1% significance level for the means as well as distributions (apart from RCO, for which
the difference in means is significant at the 5% level and the difference in distributions
is not significant). These results suggest that the more financially ”sophisticated”
households (cf. Campbell (2006)) tend to choose the more flexible, though more ex-
pensive, non-repayment mortgage to optimize dynamically their financing structure.22
Consequently, the evidence obtained so far indicates the higher LTV associated with
non-repayment mortgages does not necessarily translate into higher risk.
This picture changes quite dramatically in the final period where the distributional
differences between the two groups are no longer statistically significant (even at a 10%
significance level) for important variables such as income (INC), affordability (AFF ),
the type of housing (TY PE), the (inverse) relative cost of ownership (RCO) and the
degree of urbanization (D URBL). Furthermore, households choosing non-repayment
mortgages are now on average less highly educated (0.69 and 0.77), contrary to the
situation observed in the initial sample period. Their tax rate is higher only at 10%
22The lower net worth of the households choosing flexible mortgages (e82, 729 and e89, 705) is
not inconsistent with this view as by choosing non-compulsory repayment mortgages and deferring
payments, they avoid the need of reducing today’s consumption.
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significance level and benefits are lower at a 5% level. Finally, the differences in age
and net worth retain the same sign and similar statistical significance.
The univariate analysis of the two groups of borrowers indicates that initially
more flexible, non-repayment contracts are selected mainly by financially sophisticated
households, who do not face particular financing constraints (as their incomes are on
average higher) but who are willing to optimize dynamically their financing structure
(to maximize the utility of their lifetime consumption by, e.g., deferring repayments
and minimizing the tax liability). However, towards the end of the sample period the
differences in the characteristics of households diminish or even disappear. The loss
of the discriminatory power of the key variables indicates that non-repayment mort-
gages have to a large extent substituted compulsory repayment contracts through the
entry of below-average quality households to the group of flexible borrowers. As a
consequence, the riskiness of mortgage pool has increased and the higher LTV ratios of
flexible mortgage holders are likely to reflect financing constraints and not necessarily
the optimizing behavior with respect to the financing structure.
The results for the whole sample period provide a mixed picture for the obvious
reason that the composition of the pool of borrowers choosing non-repayment mort-
gages changes over time, as we just explained. The comparison of the two groups of
borrowers across the entire sample period reveals that households with non-repayment
mortgages have generally lower net worth, lower age, are subject to a lower tax rate,
live in a more highly urbanized areas, but also in bigger houses, while enjoying higher
income and lower social benefits (see Table 7).
[Insert Table 7 about here]
Our previous conclusions with respect to the increased riskiness of non-repayment
mortgages over time are based on the implicit assumption that non-repayment mort-
gages exhibit a higher LTV ratio. In fact, this assumption is supported by the data. A
comparison of the average LTV ratios across the two major types of mortgage contracts
indicates a growing gap between LTVs of non-repayment and repayment contracts over
the sample period. In particular, the average gap in years 2003-2005 (period 4) equals
0.52− 0.25 = 0.27, and exceeds the corresponding value for years 1992-1995 (period 1)
amounting to 0.59− 0.43 = 0.16.
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5 Regression analysis
We model empirically the following economic problem. Each household can make an
irreversible decision to buy a house.23 The decision is only going to be made if a latent
variable (a function of a number of economic, demographic and geographical vari-
ables) exceeds a certain level. As we are not able to observe the entire history of each
household (nor have an exact economic model for the value of the latent variable), the
ownership regression is aimed at explaining the maximum historical propensity to own
a house using a household’s current characteristics. Financing decisions are assumed
to be made continuously, in the sense that a household can freely choose the level of
leverage at each point throughout its house tenure. However, the type of mortgage fi-
nancing is selected only once – when the (first) mortgage is initiated. Furthermore, any
contractual restrictions on the level of leverage for compulsory repayment mortgages,
which are inherent to this type of financing products, are viewed as just one of the fac-
tors contributing to the level of leverage (and are captured by a dummy characterizing
the mortgage type).
Define OWN∗ to be the variable corresponding to the (unobserved) historical max-
imum of the propensity to own a house, with OWN∗ > 0 equivalent to a household
finding it optimal to buy their home at some point in the past. LTV ∗ is the current
borrowing propensity and reflects the desired loan-to-value ratio. We are interested in
estimating the following relationships:{
OWN∗it = X1itα + εit
LTV ∗it = X2itβ + ηit,
(1)
where Xjit, j ∈ {1, 2} is a vector of explanatory variables, parameters α and β denote
vectors of model coefficients and εit (ζit) is the error term drawn from a bivariate
normal distribution with mean 0 and variance σ2ε (σ
2
ζ ). The covariance between both
error terms is σ12, which can be different from zero. Subscripts i and t correspond to
a household and a year, respectively.
As OWN∗ and LTV ∗ describe preferences, which are not observable, we define two
new variables:
23In our sample, only 105 households, i.e., 2% of total number of households decided to reverse the





1 if OWN∗it > 0





LTV ∗it if LTV
∗
it > 0 and OWN
∗
it > 0
0 if LTV ∗it ≤ 0 and OWN∗it > 0
Not observed if OWN∗it ≤ 0.
(3)
Consequently, OWN is a binary variable describing homeownership and LTV is the
current loan-to-value ratio of a household that owns a home (therefore, LTV is only
observed in the group of owners).
In the described model, only the sign of OWN∗ is observed and LTV is observed
only when OWN∗it > 0. The vector of explanatory variables, X1it, is observed for
all data points and X2it may not be known for those observations for which OWN
∗
(or even LTV ∗) is negative. The first equation in (1) is the selection equation as it
corresponds to the household’s self-selection into the group of homeowners. The second
equation is the regression equation.
We analyze the ratio of the outstanding mortgage loan to the value (LTV) for
households that have selected to own a property and decide to borrow a strictly positive
amount. The modeling approach that most closely reflects the spirit of a household’s
decision problem is a double-hurdle regression model (Cragg (1971)). The model allows
for the absence of borrowing to be a result of i) the absence of homeownership, or ii)
the decision to finance the property entirely with equity. As data requirements for
the double-hurdle model are the most stringent, we also estimate Heckman sample
selection (cf. Amemiya (1984), see also Li and Prabhala (2006)) and OLS models with
a richer set of explanatory variables.
The double-hurdle specification is the one consistent with the system of equations
(2) and (3) but it requires that the vectors of explanatory variables (X1 and X2)
be observed for the entire sample. As some of the explanatory variables of interest
(e.g., mortgage type) are not observed for a fraction of observations (renters), the
double-hurdle model can be estimated only with a subset of explanatory variables. To
circumvent this limitation, we also estimate the Heckman sample selection model, which
does not require that X2 be observed for those households that do not self-select to the
group of owners. The disadvantage of using Heckman specification is that it assumes
that the explained variable in the regression equation (LTV ) is always positive if the
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household belongs to the group of owners.24 As such, it ignores the second possibility
in equation (3), that is, that homeowners adopt a 100% equity financing. To make sure
that our conclusions are not affected by the exclusion of the group of owners which
are non-borrowers, we estimate a tobit model using the subsample of owners. While
ignoring sample selection issues (by not taking account the third possibility in (3)),
such a specification allows for including homeowners with no outstanding mortgage
debt. Unfortunately, the tobit specification also requires that X2 be observed also for
those households who do not borrow, which puts similar restriction on the feasible set
of explanatory variables as the double-hurdle model. Therefore, we also estimate a
conditional OLS model of LTV for households that select to borrow a strictly positive
amount. This model allows us to use the full set of the explanatory variables and
does not require making specific assumptions about the reason for the exclusion from
the group of the borrowers (negative propensity to borrow or non-participation in the
housing market).25
The interpretation of the regression parameters and the corresponding marginal
effects depends on the exact model specification. For the double-hurdle, Heckman and
tobit models, it reflects the effect of the exogenous variable on the (unobserved) propen-
sity to borrow. For the OLS model, it reflects the corresponding effect on the observed
LTV conditional on the household having a mortgage loan outstanding. To see the
differences between the estimated coefficients, consider the following example. Assume
that household income affects positively both the propensity to own a house and the
propensity to borrow and that the corresponding regression error terms, which repre-
sent unobserved factors affecting the propensities, are positively correlated. Regression
coefficients of the double-hurdle, Heckman and tobit models will be the estimates of
the true parameter βinc. However, the coefficient of the OLS model reflects the effect
of income conditional on the selection to the sample of borrowers. In the analyzed
example, the conditional marginal effect is smaller than βinc. This is due to the fact
that ceteris paribus the expected LTV is higher if the household is included among the
owners, which is the result of a positive correlation between the two error terms. If
24In our sample, this assumption is violated for 1,562 observations, for which homeownership is not
associated with the presence of mortgage financing. As a result, those observations are omitted when
the Heckman model is estimated.
25As the OLS estimator based on a model with truncated data is generally biased when sample
selection is not random, see Greene (2000), pp. 902-903, we also calculate the conditional marginal
effects based on the sample selection model. The estimated effects (available upon request) are in line
with those obtained for the OLS model.
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the level of the explanatory variable increases, the magnitude of the shock needed for
the household to be included in the group of owners becomes smaller. As a smaller
(positive) error term in the selection equation is associated with a smaller expected
error in the LTV equation, the increase of the expected LTV (conditional on selection
to the group of borrowers) following the marginal change in income is lower than the
true model coefficient.26
Finally, in the second part of the analysis, we define the following variable to in-
vestigate the choice of mortgage category:
D NRPMTit ≡

1 if NRPMT ∗it > 0 and min{LTV ∗it , OWN∗it} > 0
0 if NRPMT ∗it ≤ 0 and min{LTV ∗it , OWN∗it} > 0
Not observed if min{LTV ∗it , OWN∗it} ≤ 0,
(4)
D NRPMT is therefore a dummy variable equal to 1 if a household has a non-
compulsory repayment mortgage and 0 otherwise, and NRPMT ∗ denotes the (un-
observed) propensity to select a non-compulsory repayment mortgage. Model (4) is
estimated using the sample selection probit (Heckman probit) approach. The model is
therefore based on the same principle as the standard Heckman model with the only
difference being that the explained variable in the regression model is binary (here –
mortgage category). The selection equation in the estimated Heckman probit is the
same as the selection equation of model (1).27
5.1 Results
We begin with the results of the simple model of LTV, which is formulated as follows
26The effect in tobit model will be affected in the same way as in the Heckman and double-hurdle
models with positively (negatively) correlated error terms and identical (opposite) signs of the coeffi-
cients of the relevant variable in the selection and regression equation. In such a case, the conditional
effects will be of a smaller absolute value. If in a Heckman or a double-hurdle model the positively
(negatively) correlated error terms are combined with opposite (identical) signs of the coefficients in
the selection and regression equation, then the conditional marginal effect will (in absolute terms) be
greater.
27To estimate model (4) using Heckman probit with selection equations as in (1), we essentially
assume that the sign of LTV ∗it and OWN
∗
it is the same for each pair (i, t). See also footnote 24.
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LTV ∗it = β0 + β1SQRT INCit + β2SQRT NETWORTHit + β3SQRT BENEFITit
+β4TAXit + β5TAXit ∗D AFT97 + β6D MEM2it + β7D MEM3it (5)
+β8AGEit + β9AGE
2
it + β10D EDUit + β11Y EARit + β12D URBLit + ηit.
Recall that the propensity to borrow, LTV ∗, is defined as the (desired) ratio of the
current value of the mortgage outstanding and the market value of the house. When
implementing model (5), we use LTV , given by (3), as LTV ∗ is generally not ob-
servable.28 The choice of most of the explanatory variables has been motivated in
Section 4. In addition, SQRT INC, SQRT NETWORTH and SQRT BENEFIT
are introduced and denote square-root transformations of INC, NETWORTH and
BENEFIT , respectively.29 To capture the possible effect of the tax regime shift we
also introduce the interaction dummy D AFT97 that equals 1 for period 1998-2005,
and zero otherwise. Variable Y EAR corresponds to the year number and is defined
as the actual year number minus 1992. This variable should capture a possible time
trend in household leverage that results from factors that cannot be controlled for, such
as governmental policies (aimed, e.g., at promoting homeownership), proliferation of
mortgage products or, more generally, changes in credit market conditions.
It is important to stress that we are not modeling the household’s initial (i.e., at
mortgage commencement) loan-to-value, but the outstanding loan-to-value at the time
of the survey. It is more challenging (and more general) to model the latter than the
former. For example, while the former is primarily determined by lending policies
and borrowers’ financing constraints, the latter is also affected by household life-cycle
effects, past income and liquidity shocks. As such the possible variation in outstanding
LTV is typically much larger than the variation in initial LTV. Obviously, initial LTV
is a special case of outstanding LTV (if households are surveyed immediately after
mortgage commencement, then the outstanding LTV coincides with the initial LTV).
[Insert Table 8 about here]
28We performed a robustness check of the reliability of the reported house values by estimating
model (5) for subsamples with varying maximum time since mortgage commencement. We did so to
verify whether there is any systematic bias in reported house values that may increase with the time
elapsed since house purchase. We found that our results are not particularly sensitive to the choice
of the maximum time since mortgage commencement allowed in the sample.
29The square root is a commonly used transformation in demographics research (see Goodman
(1988)) to adjust for positive skewness in variables.
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The results of the LTV regression model (5) are reported in Table 8 and gener-
ally confirm hypothesis H1 about the relevance of socio-economic variables. The sign
of the relationship between LTV and income is positive and significant for all model
specification. Depending on the specification, an increase of income by e10,000 trans-
lates for the average borrowing household (with income e25,350) into an expected
increase in LTV ratio between 0.025 and 0.039 (depending on the model specification).
The positive relation indicates a higher debt capacity of high-income households. Net
worth (NETWORTH) has a strong negative effect on outstanding LTV: less wealthy
households have no other choice but to take on more debt. An increase of e10,000
reduces expected leverage by 1-2 percentage points for the mean borrowing household,
which has a net worth of e84,797. Social benefits increase LTV – the estimate of the
net economic effect of an extra euro of social benefits on LTV ranges between 3 and
9 percentage points. The amount of taxes paid has a significantly positive (prior to
1997) but economically rather modest effect on LTV. A 1% increase in the effective
tax rate leads to an increase in LTV by 0.16-0.20 percentage points. The relationship
loses its statistical significance after 1997, that is, when tax relief on interest is phased
out, except for interest on mortgage debt.
Leverage increases with the number of household members. A second member adds
on average between 0.017 and 0.085 to LTV, which is slightly lower than the estimated
effect of any higher number of members (between 0.023 and 0.112). The marginal
effect of age varies (based on Model 1 in Table 8) from −0.012 for AGE = 20 to
−0.008 for AGE = 40 and −0.005 for AGE = 60. Education positively influences
the propensity to borrow (the estimates range from 0.013 to 0.023) and significantly
affects the observed LTV (as indicated by p-value in the conditional OLS model). The
estimate of the effect of calendar time ranges from 0.26 to 0.57 percentage points per
year. This time effect reflects the autonomous change in the levels of household leverage
that can be attributed to the changes in regulation and in the level of credit supply.
Finally, the negative coefficient of the low-level urbanization dummy (which ranges
from not significant to −0.034) indicates that the level of urbanization may positively
influence the observed LTV ratio. This result is consistent with housing in more ur-
banized areas being less affordable and, as such, requiring a higher proportion of debt
financing.
The estimated parameters of the sample selection equation (Table 8, Panel B) are
in line with the analysis of the determinants of homeownership in Section 4 and, to
a large extent, with the literature (see, e.g., Goodman (1988), Zorn (1989), Jones
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(1989), Haurin, Hendershott, and Wachter (1997) and Coulson (2002)). Namely, the
probability of homeownership is positively affected by income, net worth, education,
and the estimated tax rate. Furthermore, consistent with the results of the univariate
analysis, households having more members and who live in larger homes situated in
less highly urbanized areas are more likely to belong to the group of owners. Contrary
to the results of Section 4, social benefits do not seem to be a statistically significant
determinant of homeownership. Also, the coefficient of affordability has a negative sign
(this result may to same extent capture the non-linearity of the time trend).
Having analyzed the model of choice based on a basic set of explanatory variables,
we proceed to a richer specification that takes into account the characteristics of the
outstanding mortgage contracts. Our descriptive statistics indicate that the type of
mortgage financing chosen (payment versus non-repayment mortgages) may have a
persistent, long-term effect on the evolution of LTV. The mortgage type is fixed when
the mortgage is initiated and, as such, an exogenous variable. We denote the mortgage
type by the dummy variable D NRPMT (where D NRPMT = 1 for non-repayment
mortgages, and zero otherwise).30
We predict that the choice of mortgage type determines the effect of income on
the outstanding LTV. While income positively affects the initial LTV level, for non-
repayment mortgages this effect is likely to be higher for the following reasons. The
possibility of deferring the repayment of the principal implies that non-repayment
mortgages support a higher initial LTV ratio. Moreover, the resulting higher interest
payment allows for more significant tax deductions.
Furthermore, the time elapsed since mortgage commencement (which we denote by
MTGTIME) certainly effects LTV. Households, unlike firms, have a natural, finite
lifetime. The income generating power of households is limited in time, and therefore
also its capacity to service debt. It seems therefore unrealistic to impose the assump-
tion that households maintain some inter-temporal optimal LTV ratio. This is the
main motivation for introducing the variable MTGTIME in the regression, as well as
MTGTIME2, to allow for non-linearities.
We allow the marginal effect of income to depend on MTGTIME, the time elapsed
since mortgage commencement (to capture life-cycle effects), and also on D NRPMT ,
30It is worth pointing out that since the late nineties it has become easier and relatively cheaper for
households to remortgage and therefore to change the mortgage type. Still, among 7,860 borrower-
years, there are only 335 occurrences of a mortgage type change. Those changes are usually associated
with an increase of the level of debt.
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the mortgage repayment type (to capture the degree of discretion in repaying the
mortgage principal). More specifically, we introduce the following regressors INCV ,
INV C∗MTGTIME, INCV ∗MTGTIME2, INCV ∗D NRPMT , INCV ∗MTGTIME∗
D NRPMT and INCV ∗ MTGTIME2 ∗ D NRPMT . The quadratic term corre-
sponding to the time since mortgage commencement allows for possible non-linearities.
INCV denotes the ratio of gross income adjusted for the number of household mem-
bers (using the Eurostat scale) and exclusive of social benefits and the value of the
house. Another new variable, BENEFITV , equals the ratio of BENEFIT and the
house value.31
The inclusion of the extra variables comes at a cost – we are no longer able to
estimate tobit and double-hurdle models as they require the availability of the same
set of explanatory variables for both uncensored and censored groups of observations.
Therefore, we start our analysis with the conditional OLS regression specification and
subsequently estimate the Heckman sample selection model. As described before, the
coefficients (and marginal effects) of the OLS model are conditional on the LTV being
observed and positive, whereas the coefficients of the sample selection model reflects
the sensitivities of the unobserved propensity to borrow, LTV ∗.
[Insert Table 9 about here]
The results of the two types of the extended version of the LTV regression model
(5) are consistent across the model variants and are reported in Table 9. The sign
of the relationship between LTV and income depends on the mortgage category. For
compulsory repayment contracts, each euro of additional income translates into 33
cents of additional borrowing for the average time since mortgage commencement (T =
12.33).32 For non-compulsory repayment contracts, each euro of additional income
translates into a 39 cent increase in the borrowing level. As the marginal effect for
the repayment mortgages does not decrease with time, the positive relation indicates a
higher debt capacity of high-income households. A generally higher sensitivity of LTV
to income of non-repayment mortgages reflects the fact that a given level of income
can support higher leverage if the repayment of the principal can be delayed.
31Income and benefits are scaled by the value of the house as it is the size of the income relative to
the house value that actually matters. This scaling is similar in spirit to capital structure models for
firm leverage that scale the exogenous variables by the assets of the firm.
32In the remainder of the section, we report the sensitivities based on the conditional OLS model
unless stated otherwise.
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A somewhat less obvious result is that the marginal effect of income on LTV varies
over the lifetime of the mortgages. As previously pointed out, the behavior of the
marginal effect of income is quite different for repayment and non-repayment mort-
gages. With repayment mortgages the (positive) marginal effect on LTV is fairly stable
(it equals 0.142 for T = 0, 0.348 for T = 15 and 0.271 for T = 30). Income positively
affects the initial LTV level only, as subsequent repayment behavior is determined by
the compulsory repayment schedule. Unlike repayment mortgages, for non-repayment
contracts the marginal effect of income on LTV is monotonic and increasing over the
lifecycle of the mortgage (0.216 for T = 0, 0.424 for T = 15 and 0.573 for T = 30).
Positive income shocks lead to an increase in LTV. Furthermore, this positive relation
strengthens over time, which reflects a bigger dispersion of LTV across households as
the time increases. Towards the end of the mortgage term (T = 30) each euro of
additional income leads to an increase of about 57 cents of mortgage debt.
Our analysis confirms that net worth (NETWORTH) has a negative effect on
outstanding LTV. According to the estimate of the marginal effect for Model 1 (Table
9), an increase in net worth amounting to e10,000 reduces expected leverage by 1.18
percentage points for the average household.
Social benefits increase LTV for both types of mortgages. For households on re-
payment mortgages, the estimates of the net economic effect of an extra euro of social
benefits on outstanding mortgage debt range between 40 and 52 cents. The estimates
of the analogous effect for households on non-repayment contracts range between sta-
tistically not significant and 20 cents. (Still, the difference is significant at most at the
10% level.)
The amount of taxes paid has a statistically significantly positive (at least prior to
1997) effect on LTV. A one-percentage point increase in the effective tax rate leads
to an increase in LTV of 0.15 to 0.25 percentage points. The relationship loses its
statistical significance after 1997, that is, when tax relief on interest is phased out,
except for interest on mortgage debt.
In the extended specification, we are now able to quantify also the direct effect
of the time elapsed from the origination of the mortgage, MTGTIME. The signs of
the coefficients for time to mortgage commencement and the same variable squared
indicate that LTV is a convex decreasing function of time. Furthermore, we include
interaction terms of MTGTIME with income and mortgage category variables. Ev-
ery year elapsed from the origination of the mortgage reduces the loan-to-value ratio
on average (i.e., for the average income and the time since mortgage commencement)
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by 1.32% for repayment mortgages and by 1.40% non-repayment contracts. The de-
creasing trend is easily explained by the fact that house values tend to go up, whereas
the outstanding mortgage tends to go down over time. More surprising is the find-
ing that this time trend for repayment mortgages (taken in isolation) is statistically
not distinguishable from that for non-repayment contracts since the coefficient of vari-
able MTGTIME ∗D NRPMT (time to mortgage commencement multiplied by the
mortgage category dummy) is not significant. This does, however, not mean that the
time pattern of LTV is the same for both mortgage types. As mentioned earlier, the
marginal effect of income on LTV over the household’s life cycle is different for the
two types of mortgages. Note also that the dummy variable for non-repayment mort-
gages is positive and highly significant. The regression coefficient indicates that (after
controlling for all other effects) the outstanding LTV for non-repayment mortgages is
more than 11% percentage points higher than for repayment mortgages!
As we have already shown in Table 8, leverage increases with the number of house-
hold members. The estimates obtained for the coefficient of D MEM2 range between
0.014 and 0.061, whereas the marginal effect of D MEM2 lies between 0.045 and 0.113.
The coefficient of EDU varies from statistically not significant (the conditional OLS
model) to 0.015 (Heckman model of propensity). The estimated coefficient of calendar
time (Y EAR) range from 0.004 to 0.005. Again, as shown in Table 8, the estimated
coefficient of the low-level urbanization dummy ranges between statistically not sig-
nificant and −0.024, which may suggest that housing in more urbanized areas is less
affordable and requires a higher proportion of debt financing.
The above LTV regression leads to the important finding that outstanding LTV
is significantly higher for households that have a non-repayment mortgage than for
households with a repayment mortgage. This result holds after adjusting the explained
variable for the cash value of life insurances accumulated in investment vehicles that
are linked to non-repayment mortgages. The regression lumps, however, the various
non-repayment mortgage types in one basked by using a dummy that merely differen-
tiates non-repayment mortgages from repayment mortgages, without considering the
particular type of non-repayment mortgage. Since the features of non-repayment mort-
gages can be quite different across types, one may wonder whether the above result
holds for each of the individual types of non-repayment mortgage. We therefore extend
the analysis to allow for the dependence of the financing structure on the mortgage
type (Models 2 and 4 in Table 9). The newly introduced dummy variable D MTGk
corresponds to mortgage type k, where 2 corresponds to the traditional life insurance
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mortgage, 3 – improved life insurance mortgage, 4 – linear mortgage, 5 – endowment
mortgage, and 6 – other (such as the interest only mortgage). The benchmark type of
mortgage is the annuity mortgage, which together with the linear mortgage (type 4)
constitutes the set of the compulsory repayment mortgages.
The dummy variable of the linear (repayment) mortgage (type 4) is insignificant
making the LTV of this mortgage type similar to the one of annuity (repayment)
mortgages (the benchmark mortgage type). The dummy variables of all non-repayment
mortgages are positive and range in Model 2 from 0.032 to 0.146 (from 0.019 to 0.146
in Model 4). (Although one of the non-repayment type dummies are not significant at
10%, all four are jointly significant at 1% as indicated by the likelihood ratio test.) If we
consider the average household (by evaluating the regressors at their sample average)
then the expected LTVs for the average household are 0.378, 0.506, 0.461, 0.323, 0.391
and 0.461 depending on whether it has adopted a mortgage of type 1 to 6, respectively.
It follows that the LTV ratio is expected to be the lowest for the annuity and
linear mortgages. This result is consistent with the fact that these mortgage types are
associated with compulsory annual repayment. Conversely, households financed with
mortgages which do not include a compulsory repayment component are expected to
exhibit higher LTV ratios, which are ceteris paribus up to almost 15 percentage points
higher than the benchmark level corresponding to the annuity mortgage.
As expected (cf. hypothesis H2), the predicted LTV ratio for an average household
with a non-repayment mortgage exceeds that of an analogous household with a com-
pulsory repayment contract. The predicted difference of about 10 percentage points
does not vary much with the time elapsed. For instance, the average LTV ratio for
non-repayment mortgages exceeds its repayment counterpart by 0.124 for T = 0, by
0.099 for T = 15 and by 0.116 for T = 30).33
To investigate what causes the proliferation of non-repayment mortgages, we esti-
mate conditional and Heckman sample selection probit models that explain the prob-
ability of selecting the more innovative, non-repayment mortgage products (Table 10).
As with the analysis of LTV, homeownership is the sample selection criterion.
We use the same set of explanatory variables for the regression equation as in the
33As a robustness check (available upon request), we estimate our model after subtracting the cash
value of the investment vehicle linked to non-repayment mortgages scaled by house value, from the
numerator of LTV . These tax efficient investments comprise, for example, life insurances. Since these
investments are a substitute for paying off the mortgage principal, the described deduction is made
to capture the net level of the loan.
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model of LTV augmented with house affordability, AFF , but without the mortgage
types – which the current model aims at explaining – and mortgage duration:
NRPMT ∗it = γ0 + γ1INCVit + γ2SQRT NETWORTHit + γ3BENEFITVit
+γ4TAXit + γ5TAXit ∗D AFT97 + γ6D MEM2it + γ7D MEM3it
+γ8AGEit + γ9AGE
2
it + γ10D EDUit + γ11Y EARit + γ12D URBLit
+γ13AFFit + ζit. (6)
NRPMT ∗ is the latent variable describing the propensity to take a non-repayment
mortgage (its observable counterpart is the dummy D NRPMT ) and ζit is the error
term. The negative marginal effect of income indicates that non-repayment mortgages
are more likely to be generally selected by less affluent households. A decrease in the ra-
tio of income-to-house value by ten percentage points reduces the probability of having
the non-repayment contract by 0.010. The effect of NETWORTH, which measures
financial wealth of a household (and the presence of funds) is statistically highly signifi-
cant. An increase of NETWORTH by e10,000 reduces the probability of a household
selecting a non-repayment mortgage by 0.003. The latter two results indicate that the
selection of more flexible contracts is a response of households to financial constraints
resulting from an increasing wedge between house prices and income. The negative
relation between net worth and the probability of selecting a non-repayment mortgage
may also result from the consumption-smoothing role of flexible contracts. Namely,
households may find it optimal to maintain a desired level of consumption by deferring
the repayment of the principal. As a result of such a behavior, net worth will ceteris
paribus be lower.
[Insert Table 10 about here]
Surprisingly, the probability of selecting a flexible mortgage diminishes with the
amount of received social benefits. The effect on the probability of selecting the non-
repayment contract of increasing the ratio of social benefits to house value by ten
percentage points is −0.066.
The proliferation of non-repayment mortgages has often been attributed to tax in-
centives. There is clear evidence that tax advantages of non-repayment mortgages are
responsible for the wave of remortgaging around the turn of the century (Ministry of
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Housing (2002b)). By providing greater flexibility in timing the repayment of the out-
standing mortgage principal, non-repayment mortgages allow income to be sheltered
more effectively against taxes by using the tax deductibility of mortgage interest pay-
ments. Instead of paying off the mortgage, contributions towards the future repayment
of the principal are being deposited into a separate tax efficient investment vehicle. As
predicted, the amount of taxes paid has a positive effect on the likelihood of a non-
repayment mortgage being selected. A 1 percentage point increase in the effective tax
rate leads to an increase in the probability of selecting the non-repayment mortgage
of 0.004. (The changes in the tax code occurring after 1997 do not significantly affect
this coefficient.)
The probability of selecting a non-repayment mortgage is also higher for bigger
households and for those that have a higher level of education (however, the latter effect
is not statistically significant at the 10% level). The effect of age on the mortgage type
dummy is negative, which indicates that these are usually younger households who opt
for the more flexible form of mortgage financing. For AGE = 20, an incremental year
is associated with an 0.017 reduction in the probability of selecting a non-repayment
mortgage. The corresponding marginal effect diminishes over time and equals −0.010
and −0.004 for AGE = 40 and AGE = 60, respectively. The marginal effect of
D MEM2 equals 0.106, whereas that of D MEM3 amounts to 0.113. Finally, the
marginal effect of D EDU equals 0.021.
The marginal effects of the basic version of the model clearly indicate that calendar
time plays a significant role in explaining the probability of selecting non-compulsory
repayment mortgage contracts. For the mean household in the owners sub-sample, the
probability of selecting the more flexible mortgage contract increases by 0.028 for an
incremental year. Variable Y EAR is significant at the 1% level, which indicates that
there is an accompanying autonomous shift towards more flexible products over time,
which is independent from another variable related to time, house affordability. Since
the effect of calendar time is still present after controlling for demographic, financial,
urbanization, and house affordability indicators, we attribute it to the wider availability
of the more flexible mortgage products.34
The negative marginal effect of the low-level urbanization dummy, −0.016, is (again)
not statistically significant but its sign is consistent with the view that housing in more
urbanized areas is less affordable and, as such, associated with more flexible mortgage
34The lack of statistical significance of the marginal effect of D PER4, equal to 0.142, may reflect
the fact that AFF captures the effect of time trend, which is omitted from the Models 2 and 4.
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types. Finally, the negative coefficient of AFF suggests that lower house affordability
induces households to select more flexible contracts. (The marginal effect translates
into a 0.102 increase in probability of selecting a non-repayment contract for a reduction
in the affordability index by 0.1, however, due to a large standard error, the coefficient
is not statistically significant at the 10% level.)
The dynamic aspect of the effect of economic, demographic and location variables
on the choice of mortgage is captured by estimating the probability model separately for
the initial (1992-1995) and the final (2003-2005) period of the sample. The outcome of
the regression model largely supports the results of the univariate analysis (see Section
4) – it is the more financially sophisticated households that initially adopt flexible
mortgage contracts to optimize their dynamic financial structure and likely exposure
to taxes. In the initial period, the probability of selecting a non-repayment contract
is positively related to education, tax rate, affordability as well as to the number of
household members and negatively related to the amount of social benefits received and
age (see Table 11). The results based on period 1992-1995 support therefore hypothesis
H3a.
[Insert Table 11 about here]
The results of the empirical analysis differ dramatically if we consider the final
period. Most of the variables lose their statistical significance, apart from age and
benefits (the significance of the latter is at the 10% level). Furthermore, gross income
and net worth are now negatively related (at the 10% level) to the probability of
being financed with a flexible mortgage. Again, those results suggest that towards the
end of the sample period these are no longer predominantly financially sophisticated
households that select non-standard products. Instead, those products are at least
equally likely to be selected by less well-off, likely financially constrained households.
For those households, flexible mortgages offer the possibility of deferring the repayment
of the mortgage principal, and may be the only feasible way of financing the purchase
of a house. As a consequence, the recently observed proliferation of the non-repayment
mortgages, which also contributes to the higher levels of LTV, reflects the substitution
of traditional products by new, flexible mortgages (cf. hypothesis H3b). As such, it
signals the deterioration of the average quality of mortgage loans relative to a decade
ago.35
35The results reported in Table 11 are to a large extent corroborated by our findings concerning
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So far, we have not addressed the question of a potentially higher marginal cost
of borrowing more and selecting a non-repayment contract. According to hypothesis
H4, interest rates that households face increase with LTV and are higher when the
non-repayment feature is present. If, on the contrary, non-repayment contracts were
not more expensive than the standard, compulsory repayment mortgages, no rational
household would optimally select the latter and their market share would systematically
decrease.36
There are two potential issues that need to be taken into account when analyzing
the effect of LTV and of the mortgage type on the cost of financing. First, the interest
rates vary over time as a result of the monetary policy of the central bank and such
fluctuations are not associated with changing household characteristics. Therefore, we
use variable INT , which is defined as the difference between the mortgage interest
rate and the interest rate set by the central bank. Second, both the LTV ratio as
well the mortgage type are likely to be determined jointly with the mortgage interest
rate. Consequently, it is a prori not obvious whether a simple regression of the interest
rate on the LTV (or, on the mortgage type) is going to pick households’ demand
curve, lenders’ supply curve or some combination of both (Working (1927), see also
Binsbergen, Graham, and Yang (2009)). To circumvent this problem, we use the two-
stage regression approach, under which the predicted values of household LTV are used
instead of the actual values. In a similar spirit, we use a treatment regression when
modeling the effect of the mortgage type, which is a binary variable, on the interest
rate.37
[Insert Table 12 about here]
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 12. LTV is shown to positively
affect the interest rate level although the magnitude of the effect is surprisingly small.
the determinants of LTV across the two periods (available from the authors upon request). Income
and education have smaller or no influence on LTV in period 2003-2005 compared with the significant
positive effects in 1992-1995, whereas non-compulsory repayment mortgages are associated with, on
average, much higher LTV ratios (the coefficient of dummy D NRPMT increases from 0.09 in 1992-
1995 to 0.19 in 2003-2005).
36Obviously, when allowing for deviations from full rationality, some households may be expected to
choose those contracts as a measure of restricting consumption to pay off debt within the stipulated
horizon.
37The first stage equation for LTV and the selection equation for D NRPMT follow specifications
(5) and (6), respectively.
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For each additional 10 percentage points of the LTV ratio, the interest rate increases
by a mere 0.1 percentage points. Moreover, the interest rate decreases with income (by
0.16 percentage points for each e10,000 of income), household size, education and so-
cial benefits (0.31 percentage points for each e10,000 of benefits, despite the fact that
benefits are often regarded as a ”less pledgeable” source of income). Using the treat-
ment regression, we show that the interest rate is positively related to the flexibility
embedded in the mortgage contract. Other things being equal, non-repayment mort-
gages are associated with interest rates that are, on average, 3.55 percentage points
higher than the rates of the compulsory repayment contracts.38 Finally, we analyze
whether there are any changes in the cost of flexibility embedded in non-repayment
contracts between periods 1992-1995 and 2003-2005. The results of our test indicate
that flexible contracts become much less costly towards the end of the sample period
than at the beginning. Between 1992 and 1995 the mark-up on the borrowing cost
associated with the flexible contract amounts to 3.54 percentage points, whereas it is
not statistically significant in period 2003-2005. The proliferation of non-repayment
contracts may therefore be at least partially attributed to their declining cost.39
6 Conclusions
This paper analyzes housing finance patterns of Dutch households for the period 1992-
2005. We estimate a model for the LTV of households that have outstanding mortgage
debt and find strong evidence of life-cycle effects. LTV declines with the time elapsed
since mortgage commencement. Income positively affects the initial LTV level for
repayment mortgages. Subsequent income shocks positively affect the level of debt,
irrespective of the time since mortgage commencement. Households with little net
worth, higher marginal tax rates and a larger number of family members tend to have
a higher LTV. After controlling for all the above factors we find that the outstanding
LTVs of non-repayment mortgages are still on average 10% higher than for repayment
mortgages.
Our results also indicate that non-repayment mortgages substitute the repayment
38The magnitudes and signs of coefficients of variables explaining the mortgage type are in line with
those reported in Table 10.
39Although statistical significance of the predicted value of MTG TY PE is likely to be negatively
affected by the relatively small predictive power of regressors in the mortgage type model estimated
for years 2003-2005, we did not find a positive relationship between MTG TY PE and INT in a
regression in which the actual value of MTG TY PE was used.
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contracts by gradually replacing them in the marketplace. The proportion of non-
repayment mortgages has increased from 58% in 1992 to 88% in 2005. To find out what
may drive this trend, we estimate a probit model that has as the dependent variable
the probability of a household choosing a non-repayment mortgage (as opposed to
a repayment mortgage). We find that households with a higher marginal tax rate,
lower net worth, a lower income to house value and more household members are more
likely to have a non-repayment mortgage. This confirms the widely held belief that
non-repayment mortgages are chosen because of the tax advantages they confer.
Furthermore, following the initial period in which mostly wealthy and financially
sophisticated households chose non-repayment mortgages, we observe a shift towards
flexible contracts among less well-off families. This is partially attributed to a declining
mark-up on the interest rate charged on the non-repayment mortgages. The growing
share of less well-off households among non-repayment mortgage holders indicates that
it is declining house affordability and the resulting financing constraints that have
contributed to the proliferation of non-repayment mortgages. We therefore conclude
that over the last decade the riskiness of the total pool of mortgage contracts has
increased.
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A Definition of variables
All monetary items are translated into 1994 units.40
House value – current value of the accommodation (b26ogb), right-truncated at 2m.
OWN – dummy variable equal to 1 if a household owns a house and zero otherwise.
INC – Eurostat-adjusted gross income (btot) minus benefits (wg + ww + zw + rww +
aaw + wao + ioaw), left-truncated at 0.
NETWORTH – difference between the net worth (totasset − totdebt) left-censored
at zero and the estimated house price appreciation. The house price appreciation is
calculated as the difference between the current house value and the purchase price
house (b26ogb − wo34) (with observations corresponding to house purchases before
1950 truncated).
BENEFIT – Eurostat-adjusted unemployment, sickness and disability benefits (wg+
ww + zw + rww + aaw + wao + ioaw).
TAX – estimated effective tax rate defined as the ratio of the tax bill (the difference
between the gross and net income) and the tax base (the difference between the gross
income and the estimated mortgage interest) right-truncated at 1.
D AFT97 – dummy variable equal to 1 for observations from period 1998-2005 and
zero otherwise.
D MEM2 – dummy variable equal to 1 if a household consists of (exactly) 2 members
and zero otherwise.
D MEM3 – dummy variable equal to 1 if a household consists of at least 3 members
and zero otherwise.
AGE – age of the oldest household member expressed in years, right-truncated at 100.
D EDU – dummy variable equal to 1 for tertiary or vocational education and zero
otherwise.
Y EAR – actual year number minus 1992.
D PERn, n ∈ {2, 3, 4} – dummy variable equal to 1 in period 1996-98 (n = 2), 1999-02
(n = 3), and 2003-05 (n = 4), respectively, and to zero otherwise.
D URBL – dummy variable equal to 1 for (low) urbanization levels 3-5 and zero
otherwise (see footnote 19).
RCO – (inverse) relative cost of ownership, is constructed using our household sample
and is defined as the ratio of the average rent to the average house value in the province
of household i in year t.
40To avoid ambiguity, for some variables we provide original codes used in the survey.
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TY PE – dwelling type (1 – a single family house/duplex, 2 – flat, 3 – other).
AFF – ratio of the average income in the province of household i in year t (as reported
by the CBS and standardized for the number of household members) to the average
value of the house in that province (as reported by the Dutch land registry office).
SQRT INC – square-root transformation of INC.
SQRT NETWORTH – square-root transformation of NETWORTH.
SQRT BENEFIT – square-root transformation of BENEFIT .
INCV – ratio of INC and the house value, left-truncated at 0.
BENEFITV – ratio of BENEFIT and the house value.
LTV – ratio of the value of the loan outstanding (b26hyb) and the house value, right-
truncated at 1.5.
MTGTIME – time since mortgage commencement defined as the maximum of the
time since the current mortgage start (year − hyp61) and the time spent in a current
accommodation (year − wo5).
D MTGk, k ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5, 6} – dummy variable equal to 1 for the traditional life in-
surance mortgage (k = 2), improved life insurance mortgage (k = 3), linear mortgage
(k = 4), endowment mortgage (k = 5), and other types – such as the interest only
mortgage (k = 6), respectively.
D NRPMT – dummy variable equal to 1 for non-compulsory repayment mortgage
contracts (k = 2, 3, 5, or 6) and 0 otherwise.




Description of mortgage types:41
ANNUITY MORTGAGE: with an annuity mortgage, the total amount of your periodic
payments on interest and repayment remains the same (at least) during the period for
which the interest rate was fixed. During the first part of this period, the amount due
consists of a relatively large part of interest and a relatively small part of repayment.
In later years, it is the other way around.
TRADITIONAL LIFE-INSURANCE MORTGAGE: this sort of mortgage consists of
a loan and a life insurance policy. The idea is that there is no repayment, but only
paying interest on the loan, and paying a premium for the life-insurance policy. There
is no direct relation between the interest rate of the mortgage loan and the savings
interest rate of the life-insurance policy (in contrast with an improved life-insurance
mortgage, where there is a relation between those two interest rates).
IMPROVED LIFE-INSURANCE MORTGAGE: this is a modernized version of a tra-
ditional life insurance mortgage. An improved life-insurance mortgage consists of a
loan and a life-insurance policy. The idea is that there is no repayment, but only
paying interest on the loan, and paying a premium for the life-insurance policy. In
this case, the interest rate of the mortgage-loan and the savings interest rate of the
life-insurance policy are related, which causes monthly net-costs to be rather stable.
LINEAR MORTGAGE: with this sort of mortgage, the periodic payments include
paying off a fixed percentage of the total mortgage loan, and paying interest on the
loan that is left at that moment. Over time, the amount you pay on interest becomes
less and less, such that total monthly costs go down through the years. In the first
period of the term of the mortgage, the costs of a linear mortgage are higher than the
costs of an annuity mortgage.
ENDOWMENT MORTGAGE: with an endowment mortgage it is possible, during the
term of the mortgage, to get a new loan on (part of) the amount that you have already
paid off.
41The mortgage types description in this section is a direct translation (by CentERdata) of the
notes in the questionnaire presented to the inquired households.
41
INVESTMENT MORTGAGE: this is a new variation on the (traditional) life-insurance
mortgage. As is the case with the other life-insurance mortgages, also for most of the
investment mortgages the loan is paid off out of the benefits of a whole life-insurance
policy linked to the mortgage at the end of the mortgage period. Contrary to a(n
improved) life-insurance mortgage, the returns of the life-insurance policy are based on
the returns of an investment portfolio.
INTEREST ONLY: With this mortgage one only pays interest during the term of the
mortgage with a balloon payment due at the end.
ANNUITY CONSTRUCTION: During the term of the mortgage one pays interest
only, but at the same time one contributes to an annuity, which becomes available
at the end of the mortgage period. The annuity does not have to be used to pay off
the mortgage at the end of the mortgage period. It can be used as a supplementary
pension provision.
LIFE-INSURANCE: the lifelong mortgage with life-insurance is a variation on the
interest only mortgage. This mortgage is taken out for an indefinite period. To be sure
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Figure 1: Households Number, Housing Stock, House Price Index, Interest Rate and
House Affordability
The evolution of the Housing Stock, Number of Households, House Price Index (HPI), House Affordability, and
Interest Rates. Values presented are relative to year 1994 where all variables equal 100, except for average sample
house prices, which are expressed in thousands of euro. Total Dutch Housing Stock in 1994 is 6.192 million houses.
Total number of households in the Netherlands in 1994 is 6.445 million. The HPI1994 (Land Registry) equals 100,
and the average house value for our sample in year 1994 is 136 thousand euro. House Affordability is measured as
the ratio of an index measure of standardized income (which equals 100 in 1994) and the House Price Index. The
interest rate variable is presented as an index with value 100 for year 1994, and refers to the Guilder Market Interest
Rate until 1999, and the Eurozone thereafter. The guilder interest rate for year 1994 is 5.14%. (Data Sources:
Statistics Netherlands (CBS), Dutch Land Registry Office, and DNB Household Survey.)
Figure 2: Number of Household Members and Loan to Value Histograms
Panel A: Number of Household Members Panel B: Initial Loan to Value
Panel C: Loan to Value (All Homeowners) Panel D: Loan to Value (Mortgage Holders)
Histograms for the number of household members and mortgage loan to values. Panel A presents the histogram
of the distribution of households considering the number of household members for the full sample of households.
Average number of members is 2.58, with standard deviation 1.32. Total number of observations in Panel A is
13,546. Panel B presents the histogram of the distribution of households considering the initial mortgage loan
to house value for the full sample of households. Average initial loan to value is 0.781, with standard deviation
0.246. Total number of observations in Panel B is 6,351. Households considered in Panel B are only those reporting
initial loan to value between 0.10 and 1.10, in order to remove outliers originating in the usage of different units to
measure initial loan and initial house values in the sample. Panel C presents the histogram of the distribution of
households considering mortgage loan to value at the moment of response to the questionnaire. All owner households
are considered in Panel C. Average loan to value for all owner households is 0.415, with standard deviation 0.307.
Total number of observations in Panel C is 9,422. Panel D presents the histogram of the distribution of households
considering mortgage loan to value at the moment of response to the questionnaire. Only mortgaged households
are considered in Panel D, and average loan to value is 0.497, with standard deviation 0.270. Total number of















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8: Basic Regression Model of Mortgage Loan to Value
Results of the regression model of loan to value using different methods. Model 1 is estimated using OLS regression.
Model 2 is estimated using a tobit regression. Model 3 is estimated using a Heckman model, which considers a
sample selection equation describing the decision to own a house. Model 4 is estimated using a double hurdle model,
with a sample selection equation describing the decision to own a house and censoring at the zero level of loan
to value. Panel A describes the results of the regression equation for loan to value. Panel B presents the results
of the selection equation for homeownership. The dependent variable in Panel B is binary and equals one if the
household owns its home, and zero otherwise. Panel C presents model statistics. Independent variables are defined
in Appendix A.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Estimate p-val Estimate p-val Estimate p-val Estimate p-val
Panel A: Regression Equation Dependent variable is LTV
Intercept 1.0709 0.000 0.6211 0.000 0.6993 0.000 0.5145 0.000
SQRT INC 0.0008 0.000 0.0012 0.000 0.0010 0.000 0.0012 0.000
SQRT NETWORTH -0.0008 0.000 -0.0012 0.000 -0.0005 0.000 -0.0008 0.000
SQRT BENEFIT 0.0003 0.016 0.0006 0.000 0.0002 0.181 0.0003 0.001
TAX 0.1681 0.000 0.1928 0.000 0.1965 0.000 0.1902 0.000
TAX ∗ D AFT97 -0.1138 0.000 -0.1777 0.000 -0.1286 0.000 -0.1639 0.000
D MEM2 0.0177 0.155 0.0583 0.000 0.0764 0.000 0.0851 0.000
D MEM3 0.0230 0.069 0.0706 0.000 0.1034 0.000 0.1124 0.000
AGE -0.0163 0.000 -0.0035 0.034 -0.0109 0.000 -0.0058 0.000
AGE2 0.0001 0.000 0.0000 0.276 0.0000 0.161 0.0000 0.978
D EDU -0.0013 0.869 0.0207 0.001 0.0126 0.133 0.0229 0.000
Y EAR 0.0026 0.025 0.0057 0.000 0.0042 0.001 0.0049 0.000
D URBL -0.0336 0.000 -0.0219 0.000 -0.0069 0.445 -0.0003 0.962
Panel B: Selection Equation Dependent variable equals 1 if Household owns home, 0 otherwise.
Intercept -1.9354 0.000 -1.8825 0.000
SQRT INC 0.0042 0.000 0.0046 0.000
SQRT NETWORTH 0.0051 0.000 0.0078 0.000
SQRT BENEFIT -0.0007 0.371 -0.0007 0.228
TAX 0.4174 0.052 0.3338 0.101
TAX ∗ D AFT97 -0.3071 0.074 0.0104 0.955
D MEM2 0.4818 0.000 0.4084 0.000
D MEM3 0.8974 0.000 0.9557 0.000
AGE 0.0558 0.000 0.0315 0.000
AGE2 -0.0007 0.000 -0.0004 0.000
D EDU 0.1488 0.002 0.1519 0.000
Y EAR -0.0059 0.684 -0.0074 0.643
D URBL 0.2123 0.045 0.2223 0.000
D URBL ∗ MEM2 0.1716 0.160 0.1708 0.025
D URBL ∗ MEM3 0.0821 0.506 0.0942 0.235
RCO 0.0503 0.299 0.0826 0.129
TY PE -0.3134 0.000 -0.3149 0.000
AFF -5.1308 0.010 -4.4946 0.058
(cont’d)
(cont’d) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Panel C: Model Statistics and Tests
Total Number of Observations 7,860 9,422 11,984 13,546
No. Censored Observations 1,567 4,124 4,124
No. Uncensored Observations 7,855 7,860 9,422
R2, Pseudo - R2 0.40 0.50
Log-pseudolikelihood -2441.2 -3973.1 -4561.5
Wald χ2 testing joint significance of 2 equations χ2(12) = 1556.9
p-value for χ2 0.000
Estimate of ρ 0.736 0.616
Wald χ2 Statistics testing ρ = 0 (tests independence) χ2(1) = 147.0 χ2(1) = 283.11
p-value for χ2 0.000 0.000
Table 9: Extended Regression Model of Mortgage Loan to Value
Results of the regression model of loan to value using different methods. Models 1 and 2 are estimated using OLS regression. Models
3 and 4 are estimated using a Heckman model, which considers a sample selection equation describing the decision to own a house.
Panel A describes the results of the regression equation for loan to value. Panel B presents model statistics. Independent variables
are defined in Appendix A.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Panel A: Regression Equation Dependent variable is LTV
Intercept 0.6670 0.000 0.6770 0.000 0.4552 0.000 0.4638 0.000
INCV 0.1416 0.186 0.1478 0.178 0.1054 0.353 0.1038 0.372
INCV ∗ MTGTIME 0.0232 0.097 0.0229 0.108 0.0309 0.035 0.0315 0.034
INCV ∗ MTGTIME2 -0.0006 0.110 -0.0006 0.117 -0.0008 0.048 -0.0008 0.044
INCV ∗ D NRPMT 0.0740 0.587 0.0710 0.608 0.1167 0.409 0.1175 0.413
INCV ∗ MTGTIME ∗ D NRPMT -0.0074 0.613 -0.0096 0.519 -0.0125 0.403 -0.0153 0.315
INCV ∗ MTGTIME2 ∗ D NRPMT 0.0005 0.279 0.0006 0.221 0.0006 0.217 0.0007 0.158
SQRT NETWORTH -0.0007 0.000 -0.0007 0.000 -0.0005 0.000 -0.0005 0.000
BENEFITV 0.5174 0.000 0.5091 0.000 0.4157 0.009 0.3984 0.014
BENEFITV ∗ D NRPMT -0.3188 0.129 -0.3158 0.130 -0.3962 0.072 -0.3797 0.083
TAX 0.1671 0.000 0.1576 0.000 0.2453 0.000 0.2362 0.000
TAX ∗ D AFT97 -0.1071 0.000 -0.0983 0.001 -0.1250 0.000 -0.1162 0.000
D NRPMT 0.1134 0.000 0.1170 0.000
D MTG2 0.1465 0.000 0.1491 0.000
D MTG3 0.1017 0.000 0.1071 0.000
D MTG4 -0.0555 0.000 -0.0598 0.000
D MTG5 0.0321 0.403 0.0191 0.612
D MTG6 0.1017 0.000 0.1016 0.000
D NRPMT ∗ MTGTIME -0.0017 0.254 -0.0019 0.196 -0.0020 0.181 -0.0022 0.150
MTGTIME -0.0239 0.000 -0.0240 0.000 -0.0236 0.000 -0.0238 0.000
MTGTIME2 0.0004 0.000 0.0004 0.000 0.0004 0.000 0.0004 0.000
D MEM2 0.0144 0.233 0.0171 0.153 0.0582 0.000 0.0613 0.000
D MEM3 0.0450 0.001 0.0444 0.002 0.1127 0.000 0.1120 0.000
D EDU 0.0014 0.843 0.0011 0.874 0.0153 0.033 0.0152 0.031
Y EAR 0.0038 0.001 0.0038 0.001 0.0054 0.000 0.0054 0.000
D URBL -0.0232 0.002 -0.0243 0.001 -0.0012 0.870 -0.0020 0.790
Panel B: Model Statistics and Tests
Total Number of Observations 7,860 7,860 11,984 11,984
No. Censored Observations 4,124 4,124
No. Uncensored Observations 7,860 7,860
R2, Pseudo - R2 0.52 0.53
Log-pseudolikelihood -3082.4 -3026.5
Wald χ2 testing joint significance of 2 equations χ2(20) = 3603 χ2(24) = 3858
p-value for χ2 0.000 0.000
Estimate of ρ 0.692 0.704
Wald χ2 Statistics testing ρ = 0 (tests independence) χ2(1) = 122.3 χ2(1) = 143.6
p-value for χ2 0.000 0.000
Table 10: Regression Model of Mortgage Category: All Observations
Results of the regression model explaining the probability of a household choosing a mortgage contract with non-repayment features.
Models 1 and 2 are estimated using a standard probit specification. Models 3 and 4 are estimated using a Heckman probit specification,
which considers a sample selection equation describing the decision to own a house. Panel A describes the decision to choose
a mortgage contract with non-repayment features. The dependent variable in Panel A is binary and equals one if the household
chooses a repayment mortgage, and zero otherwise. Panel B presents model statistics. Independent variables are defined in Appendix
A.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Panel A: Regression Equation Dependent variable equals 1 if repayment mortgage, 0 otherwise.
Intercept 2.2765 0.000 3.9515 0.000 2.5459 0.000 4.1867 0.000
INCV -0.2873 0.081 -0.2914 0.078 -0.3137 0.061 -0.3187 0.058
SQRT NETWORTH -0.0005 0.006 -0.0005 0.007 -0.0007 0.025 -0.0007 0.026
BENEFITV -1.9475 0.001 -1.9674 0.001 -1.7922 0.004 -1.8047 0.004
TAX 1.1250 0.000 1.0827 0.000 1.0611 0.000 1.0180 0.000
TAX ∗ D AFT97 -0.1807 0.308 -0.1367 0.453 -0.1639 0.353 -0.1214 0.502
D MEM2 0.3218 0.002 0.3218 0.001 0.2749 0.026 0.2732 0.028
D MEM3 0.3375 0.001 0.3382 0.001 0.2765 0.042 0.2749 0.044
AGE -0.0719 0.000 -0.0727 0.000 -0.0755 0.000 -0.0763 0.000
AGE2 0.0005 0.001 0.0005 0.001 0.0006 0.001 0.0006 0.001
D EDU 0.0634 0.246 0.0676 0.215 0.0507 0.367 0.0543 0.333
Y EAR 0.0834 0.000 0.0816 0.000
D PER2 -0.0821 0.118 -0.0792 0.132
D PER3 -0.0132 0.897 -0.0091 0.929
D PER4 0.1420 0.204 0.1419 0.203
D URBL -0.0467 0.445 -0.0466 0.445 -0.0657 0.316 -0.0663 0.311
AFF -3.0258 0.244 -12.7535 0.000 -3.0056 0.246 -12.4719 0.000
Panel B: Model Statistics and Tests
Total Number of Observations 7,860 7,860 11,984 11,984
No. Censored Observations 4,124 4,124
No. Uncensored Observations 7,860 7,860
R2, Pseudo - R2 0.092 0.092
Log-pseudolikelihood -4167.4 -4170.7 -9292.3 -9296.1
Wald χ2 testing joint significance of 2 equations χ2(13) = 417.3 χ2(15) = 435.5 χ2(13) = 426.6 χ2(15) = 445.4
p-value for χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Estimate of ρ -0.146 -0.150
Wald χ2 statistics testing ρ = 0 (independence test) χ2(1) = 0.68 χ2(1) = 0.70
p-value for χ2 0.411 0.403
Table 11: Regression Model of Mortgage Category: Periods 1992-1995 and 2003-2005
Results of the regression model explaining the probability of a household choosing a mortgage contract with non-repayment features.
Models 1 and 2 correspond to years 1992-1995 (period 1). Models 3 and 4 correspond to years 2003-2005 (period 4). Models 1 and
3 are estimated using a standard probit specification. Models 2 and 4 are estimated using a Heckman probit specification, which
considers a sample selection equation describing the decision to own a house. Panel A describes the decision to choose a mortgage
contract with non-repayment features. The dependent variable in Panel A is binary and equals one if the household chooses a
repayment mortgage, and zero otherwise. Panel B presents model statistics. Independent variables are defined in Appendix A.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Panel A: Regression Equation Dependent variable equals 1 if repayment mortgage, 0 otherwise.
Intercept -1.7404 0.333 -0.8931 0.618 15.2480 0.194 14.5384 0.214
INCV -0.2897 0.227 -0.4081 0.081 -0.8086 0.088 -0.7554 0.106
SQRT NETWORTH -0.0003 0.211 -0.0009 0.002 -0.0007 0.061 -0.0003 0.661
BENEFITV -2.4669 0.001 -2.0332 0.007 -3.7617 0.082 -4.1255 0.057
TAX 0.9753 0.000 0.8448 0.000 0.8447 0.116 0.9296 0.094
D MEM2 0.3629 0.001 0.2461 0.036 0.2446 0.172 0.3267 0.103
D MEM3 0.4228 0.000 0.2683 0.037 0.0468 0.812 0.1643 0.495
AGE -0.0669 0.000 -0.0805 0.000 -0.1311 0.000 -0.1255 0.001
AGE2 0.0005 0.006 0.0007 0.000 0.0009 0.007 0.0008 0.015
D EDU 0.2102 0.001 0.1580 0.012 -0.1340 0.361 -0.1091 0.464
Y EAR 0.3185 0.003 0.3076 0.004 -0.1896 0.484 -0.1854 0.491
D URBL -0.0230 0.727 -0.0896 0.187 -0.0788 0.554 -0.0448 0.743
AFF 17.3647 0.084 17.3052 0.079 -94.5181 0.374 -92.2506 0.383
Panel B: Model Statistics and Tests
Total Number of Observations 3,566 5,242 1,507 2,372
No. Censored Observations 1,676 865
No. Uncensored Observations 3,566 1,507
R2, Pseudo - R2 0.045 0.105
Log-pseudolikelihood -2225.8 -4250.3 -519.8 -1635.3
Wald χ2 testing joint significance of 2 equations χ2(12) = 169.6 χ2(12) = 171.6 χ2(12) = 63.13 χ2(12) = 57.38
p-value for χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Estimate of ρ -0.425 0.253
Wald χ2 Statistics testing ρ = 0 (tests independence) χ2(1) = 8.34 χ2(1) = 0.67
p-value for χ2 0.004 0.414
Table 12: Regression Models of Mortgage Interest Rate
Results of the regression model explaining the mortgage interest rate. Model 1 is estimated using the 2SLS method, with predicted
values of LTV obtained as a result of stage 1. Models 2-4 are based using the treatment regression, where the mortgage type is a
binary treatment variable. Models 1 and 2 are based on the entire sample of the borrowers, model 3 corresponds to years 1992-1995
(period 1), whereas model 4 corresponds to years 2003-2005 (period 4). Panel A describes the determinants of the mortgage interest
rate, INT . Panel B presents model statistics. Independent variables are defined in Appendix A.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Panel A: Regression Equation Dependent variable is INT
Intercept 0.0448 0.921 -3.3576 0.000 -3.7419 0.000 2.4617 0.005
LTV 1.0208 0.000
MTG TY PE 3.5472 0.000 3.8396 0.000 -0.4897 0.411
SQRT INC -0.0047 0.000 -0.0033 0.000 -0.0023 0.002 0.0009 0.268
SQRT BENEFIT -0.0018 0.049 0.0012 0.267 0.0020 0.160 -0.0007 0.608
D MEM2 -0.3754 0.000 -0.5774 0.000 -0.8079 0.000 -0.1208 0.280
D MEM3 -0.2894 0.001 -0.5379 0.000 -0.9055 0.000 -0.0884 0.470
AGE 0.1010 0.000 0.1496 0.000 0.1513 0.000 0.0545 0.004
AGE2 -0.0008 0.000 -0.0012 0.000 -0.0012 0.000 -0.0006 0.001
D EDU -0.1040 0.071 -0.2056 0.009 -0.4734 0.000 -0.1253 0.164
D URBL -0.1957 0.001 -0.1464 0.072 -0.1790 0.101 -0.2604 0.001
Panel B: Model Statistics and Tests
Number of Observations 7,860 7,860 3,566 1,507
R2 0.001
Log-pseudolikelihood -19479 -8901.0 -2827.8
Wald χ2 testing joint significance of 2 equations χ2(9) = 2952 χ2(9) = 3331 χ2(9) = 32.56
p-value for χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Estimate of ρ -0.895 -0.970 0.056
Wald χ2 Statistics testing ρ = 0 (tests independence) χ2(1) = 2135 χ2(1) = 1746 χ2(1) = 0.04
p-value for χ2 0.000 0.000 0.845
